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ABSTRACT
This thesis develops a Measure of Effectiveness (MOE)
for strategic defenses from open source political litera-
ture. First, an examination of the doctrines and strategic
nuclear force structures of the United States and the Soviet
Union is conducted to illuminate the primary challenges to a
U. S. system of strategic defense. Second, the issue of
utilizing strategic defense for the protection of U. S.
retaliatory nuclear forces ( counterforce enhancement) is
addressed. Third, the degree of effectiveness which a coun-
terforce enhancing system of strategic defense must meet is
established through the definition of minimal retaliatory
assets required to effect U. S. targeting plans. Finally,
the conclusions and findings of this research are presented
in a summary chapter.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
On March 23 1983 President Ronald Reagan astonished a
national audience with the pronouncement of a new stratagem
for national nuclear defense fundamentally removed from the
"established" posture of deterrence through the doctrine of
mutually assured destruction (MAD). In brief, the Chief
Executive's televised address heralded the genesis of the
Strategic Defense Initiative ( SDI ) , a program conceived in
part to synthesize the scientific and technological
resources of the United States in a coherent effort to
analyze the practicability of integrating strategic defenses
with U. S. nuclear policy. The ultimate goal of this effort
would be the rendering of nuclear weaponry "impotent and
obsolete. " [ Ref . 1]
Initial reaction to the so-called "Star Wars" speech was
both critical as well as supportive, and the past three
years have not witnessed a lessening in the intensity of
debate on the merits of the Presidential proposal. To
paraphrase the late Herman Kahn, it would appear that four
fundamental schools of thought have developed within polit-
ical, defense and intellectual circles regarding the issue
of strategic defenses: There are those who enthusiastically
support .the proposal, those who vehemently oppose the
proposal, those who remain largely uncommited on the issue
and those who remain uninformed on the topic.
This thesis does not purport to analyze in depth the
foundations of the arguments preferred by each camp.
Rather, it attempts to develop a Measure of Effectiveness
(MOE) for a system of strategic defense from open source
political literature.
B. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
A quantitative measure used to compare the effectiveness
of alternatives in achieving a given objective is called a
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) [ Ref . 2; p. 13] . In other
words, an MOE may be construed as an index by which perform-
ance towards the achievement of a given goal or objective
may be gauged. Measures of Performance (MOP), Figure of
Merit (FOM), operational effectiveness, and utility are
frequently used interchangeably and synonymously with the
term Measure of Effectiveness [Ref. 3: p. 2] . To be valid,
an MOE must be closely related to the objective of the oper-
ation in question and must be measurable and quantifiable.
Mathematically, a MOE may be represented by the equation
(x-) = arg.MAXj^Fx(x). ( eqn 1.1)
Here, F( X-)
^
represents a mathematical model for the system
under study; ( x* ) represents the optim.al solution (in this
case scalar) subject to real-world'^'onstraints [Ref. 3:
p. 4] .
From a less mathematically oriented position, however.
Naval Operations Analysis provides succinct guidelines for
users of MOE methodology [Ref. 2: p. 13] . First, the MOE
must be closely related to the objective or goal of the
operation. Second, it must be measurable and quantifiable.
Finally, it must measure to what degree the objective is
achieved. - -
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This thesis will conduct a detailed analysis of the
following areas in an effort to define an objective function
suitable for the methodology of MOEs with respect to stra-
tegic defenses. First, an examination of the doctrines and
strategic nuclear force structures of the United States and
the Soviet Union is conducted to illuminate the primary
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challenges to a U. S. system of strategic defense. Second,
the issue of utilizing strategic defenses for the protection
of U. S. retaliatory nuclear forces ( counterforce enhance-
ment) is addressed. Third, the degree of effectiveness
which a counterforce enhancing system of strategic defense
must meet is established through the definition of minimal
retaliatory assets required to effect U. S. targeting plans.
Finally, the conclusions and findings of this research are
presented in a summary chapter.
II. STRATEGIC DOCTRINES AND FORCE STRUCTURES
A. U. S. DECLARATORY DOCTRINE
A working knowledge of the strategic objectives of both
the United States and the Soviet Union is critical in
assessing the viability of strategic options designed to
fulfill the objectives of both superpowers in a nuclear
exchange. After all, doctrinal considerations are influen-
tial in the accquisition of strategic forces and the devel-
opment of employment policies. Accordingly, this chapter
begins with an examination of the declaratory strategic
doctrine of the United States.
The fundamental, and according to Slocombe [ Ref , 4:
p. 611] , "unchanged" strategic objective of the United States
is the deterrence of aggression that could possibly lead to
a nuclear confrontation. Official policy statements by
government officials and the political literature of the
defense intellectual community uniformly correspond with
Slocombe 's recognition of deterrence as the conceptual
cornerstone of United States strategic doctrine. What is not
universally acknowledged, however, is the precise mechanism
(if one indeed exists) through which the United States
transforms the abstractions of deterrence theory into
palpable strategic doctrine and policy.
Gray [Ref. 5: p. 2] identifies the three schools of
deterrent thought that permeate U. S. doctrinal and policy
debates. The first perspective, that of "Societal
Punishment, " maintains that Soviet aggression is deterred
through the prospect of massive societal punishment
inflicted by the retaliatory strategic nuclear forces ( SNF)
of the United States. An alternative viewpoint is offered
by the second school, which alludes that the U. S. S. R. is
deterred when confronted by credible threats focused on the
10
highest of official (not necessarily societal) Soviet values
and interests. Advocates of this orientation, known as the
"Countervailing Strategy," suggest that the United States
effectively deters its adversary by threatening to thwart
Soviet strategy (i.e., denying the Soviets "victory") by
forcefully eliminating the war-waging capabilities of the
Soviet state. Proponents of the third school, that of the
"Prevailing Strategy," assert that the U. S. S. R. is deterred
when the United States is able to impose military defeat on
the Soviets while simultaneously securing the achievement of
Western political goals and objectives.
A brief review of Gray's description of these three
basic schools of deterrent thought should illuminate the
fundamental dissimilarities and commonalities among them.
Arrival at this sort of conclusion is intuitively correct,
as there are obvious differences between an approach which
advocates extensive human punishment on one hand ( a "coun-
tervalue" strategy), the thwarting of war aims on another (a
"counterforce" strategy), or the imposition of victory on
yet another (a "counterforce-plus" strategy). Arrival at
this conclusion is also supported by the historical record
and is best substantiated through an analysis of the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) policy debates of the late
1960 's [ Ref . 6]. The direct outcome of these debates (U.S.
advocacy and establishment of a treaty limiting the deploy-
ment of ABM systems by both superpowers) represents a decid-
edly clear victory for the societal punishment school of
strategic thought [Ref. 7: p. 215] . Yet each school allows
for flexibility in strategic targeting, as well as compat-
ability with U. S. force planning requirements to enhance the
viability of its position [Ref. 5: p. 3] . Of significance to
this thesis, however, is the correct identification of the
deterrent school of thought which exerts the dominant influ-
ence on current U. S. strategic nuclear doctrine and force
planning.
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Payne notes that the paradigm of "mutual vulnerability"
associated with the societal punishment or "assured vxilner-
ability" school of deterrent thought has dominated strategic
theorizing in the U.S. defense community [ Ref . 7: p. 215]
.
This observation is accurate in correctly identifying the
intellectual perceptions of most analysts in the defense
community regarding the nature of U. S. nuclear strategy.
It is somewhat erroneous, however, as a reflection of the
realities of U. S. strategic nuclear doctrine.
The inadequacy of mutual assured vulnerability as a
legitimate paradigm for deterrence stems from a basic obser-
vation of the current U. S. -Soviet relationship: mutual
assured vulnerability is neither mutual nor assured. In the
first place, a substantial quantity of evidence exists in
the military and political literature of both superpowers
supporting the thesis that the Soviets do not regard mutual
assured vulnerability as a two-sided relationship. Secondly,
a valid argument may be made to the effect that this partic-
ular paradigm is not necessarily assured in nature. This is
especially noticeable when an evaluation of the military
utility of U. S. SNF is conducted following a preemptive
counterforce first strike. These two points will be examined
in further detail in this and subsequent chapters of this
thesis.
Friedberg [ Ref. 8: pp. 556-568] argues that extensive
adherence to the doctrine of assured vulnerability (or
"mutual vulnerability") by many strategic analysts is the
direct result of historical and conceptual confusion.
Historical confusion, according to Friedberg, arises from
limited ( if any) public access to highly classified nuclear
war planning documents; conceptual confusion is produced by
imprecisions in strategic language, with the incorrect usage
of the word "doctrine" cited as a classic example.
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Due to the unclassified nature of this thesis, it would
be difficult to dispense entirely with historical confusion
and its accompanying influence on doctrinal analysis.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that a close
approximation of actual U. S. strategic doctrine may be
constructed through a careful examination of unclassified
policy statements by high-level U. S. government officials
and other authoritative political literature. Conceptual
confusion, on the other hand, may be negated simplistically
with the following reasoning.
Ermarth defines "strategic doctrine" as "a set of opera-
tive beliefs, values and assertions that in a significant
way guide official behavior with respect to strategic
research and development, weapons selection, deployment of
forces, operational plans, arms control, etc." [ Ref . 9:
p. 596] If this definition remains fundamental to strategic
planning in the U.S., then Friedberg's assertion that
an astute analyst would expect to find a ' strategy'
which called only for massive retaliatory nuclear
strikes against enemy cities, a force posture capable of
executing such attacks but suitable for little else, a
selection of weapons and an R & D process which
reflected a complete lack of interest in defensive
systems or offensive forces intended for countermilitary
missions, and arms control and declaratory policies
which stressed stability, equality, and the importance
of mutual vulnerability, [Ref. 8: p. 568]
is very difficult to refute and serves to illuminate the
fundamental conceptual error inherent in the assured vulner-
ability paradigm. In other words, Friedberg suggests that a
methodology which first reviews official policy statements
regarding American strategic doctrine and second examines
the structure of the nuclear assets of the United States
armed forces will indicate that the widespread acceptance of
assured vulnerability as a deterrent mechanism by defense
intellectuals is erroneous.
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Consider then, the following excerpt from Defense
Secretary Caspar Weinberger's Fiscal Year 1986 Annual Report
commenting on the utility of a deterrent nuclear strategy
predicated on the concept of assured vulnerability:
By 1961, Soviet nuclear capabilities had grown to the
point that the inflexible U. S. strategy of massive
retaliation was no longer credible. Consequently, the
Kennedy Administration formulated a strategy of flexible
response that combined a wide range of conventional and
nuclear capabilities to enforce deterrence. Today, some
24 years later, U.S. policy remains one of deterrence
through flexible response . To be sure, tHe Soviet
threat has evolved, so too has our strategy of flexible
response. Additional response options and capabilities
were built into our nuclear plans and our forces in
order to maintain deterrence in the face of Soviet
developments. Each of the changes under succeeding
administrations had been designed to ensure that the
United States possesses the capability to meet aggres-
sion at any level an adversary might contemplate- -and
thus prevent it (empHasis added). I Ref . 10: p. 46J
This statement suggests that the declaratory nuclear policy
of the United States has and continues to reject advocacy of
unhibited retaliatory nuclear strikes against a predomi-
nately countervalue Soviet target set as a viable strategic
option.
Additionally, the possibility of a failure of the deter-
rent mechanism implemented by U. S. doctrine and posture is
acknowledged in the Annual Report , as is the inherent diffi-
culty in predicting the escalatory pattern of a conflict
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Secretary
Weinberger does, however, codify the fundamental objective
of U. S. strategy in this circumstance:
Should deterrence fail. U.S. strategy seeks the earliest
termination of conf licr on terms favorable to the United
States , its allies , aiiH its national security obi ec -
tives . ' Favorable ' means that if war is forced upon us,
we must win--we cannot allow aggression to benefit the
aggressor. It does not mean more territory or other
powers for the United States. In seeking the earliest
termination of the conflict, the~United States not onTy
would act to defeat the aggression but would try to
convince the attacker to halt his advance because his
continued aggression would entail grave risks to his own
interests (emphasis added). [Ref. 10: p. 27]
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Three distinct conclusions may be derived from analysis
of the preceeding statements. First, the fundamental struc-
ture of United States nuclear doctrine has exhibited remark-
able stability over a period exceeding two decades,
irrespective of incumbent administrations. This stability
is evinced by policy statements which consistently reflect
the thwarting of Soviet war objectives through a strategy of
denial across the spectrum of conflict as a fundamental
principle. The stated objective of restoring the "status quo
ante bellum" should deterrence fail is diametrically opposed
to the indiscriminate countervalue targeting associated with
the societal punishment school of deterrent thought.
Second, there is every reason to expect this continuity to
extend to the immediately forseeable future, as Gray and
Payne have suggested [ Ref . 5,7: pp. 3, 205-206] . Third, it is
reasonable to suggest that the paradigm correctly describing
U. S. strategic nuclear doctrine is the "countervailing
strategy. "
First officially outlined in the 1979 Annual Report of
Defense Secretary Harold Brown, the doctrine of "countervai-
lance" represented the culmination of an 18 month review of
U. S. defense policies initiated by President Jimmy Carter in
the summer of 1977. On July 25 1980, President Carter signed
Presidential Directive Number 59 (PD-59), an implementing
directive which codified the doctrine and provided further
guidance in the realms of strategic targeting and weapons
systems acquisitions.
Slocombe provides a succinct description of the basic
elements of the doctrine set forth in PD-59:
Under the countervailing strategy, as before, the funda-
mental U. S. objective is and remains deterrence--but
not just of massive attacks on U. S. cities. The United
States needs to consider also how to make U. S. nuclear
power contribute to deterrence of less than all-out
attacks, and particularly how to disabuse Soviets of the
belief that a large-scale but still limited aggression,
e.g., an attack on U.S. ICBMs or an attack on Europe,
could work to their advantage. More generally, the
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United States needs to have forces and plans capable of
conyincina the Soviet leadership that in reality they
could not win a nuclear var--whether or not they believe
that such wars are m theory winnable by those who have
on their side the alleged historical inevitability of
the triumph of socialism (emphasis added). [ Ref . 4:
p. 613]
He further notes that the countervailing strategy does not
represent a new doctrine nor a fundamental departure from
previous U. S. strategic policies but rather an "evolu-
tionary refinement" of previously established strategic
concepts [Ref. 4: p. 615] .
The "evolutionary refinement" of strategic principles
which Slocombe refers to continues to this day. Consider the
following excerpt from Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's
Fiscal Year 1987 Annual Report :
We do not, in fact, plan our retaliatory options to
maximize Soviet casualities or to attack deliberately
the Soviet population. Indeed, wg believe such a
doctrine would be neither moral nor prudent . It is not
moral because tEe Soviet people should not deliberately
be made the victims of any U.S. retaliation to an attacli
launched by the Soviet leadership. It is not prudent
because secure deterrence should be based on the threat
ro aestroy wnat tne boviet ieaaersnip values mosT:
HTqhly ; itsel"F| Tts military power and political control
process
,
and its industrial ability to wage war" The
United States government knows that a nuclear war cannot
be won. Our nuclear doctrine is designed to ensure that
the Soviet Union'"s leadership also Believes tliat a
nuclear war can never 5e won- -however , they define
victorv--and , therefore , must never be fought (emphasis
added ) . fRef . 11: p. 75]
It is clear, then, that analysis of recent and current
official statements regarding the fundamental nature of
United States nuclear doctrine and policy support
Friedberg's assertion that the U.S. does not adhere to a
strategy of assured vulnerability predicated on the ability
to affect massive societal punishment [ Ref. 8: p. 568]
.
Furthermore, U. S. declatory policy has and remains remark-
ably consistent with Slocombe' s description of the funda-
mental deterrent objectives of the countervailing strategy
codified by PD-59 [Ref. 4: pp. 613-614]
.
16
Correlating official policy statements with the theoret-
ical prescriptions of a countervailing strategy is by itself
insufficient in establishing actual U. S. doctrine and
policy, however. Because effective deterrence is achieved
through a credibility derived from "visible, effective, and
employable military capabilities," it is also necessary to
conduct an examination of the composition of U. S. strategic
nuclear forces (SNF) to determine their utility in the
fulfilling the purported objectives of a countervailing
strategy [ Ref . 12: p. 223].
B. U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES (SNF)
The strategic nuclear forces of the United States are
distributed among three legs of a strategic TRIAD, and the
following excerpt from the Fiscal Year 1986 Annual Report
explains the rationale for this particular disposition:
The combined effect of having three complementary legs
complicates Soviet attack planning and any efforts to
prevent U. S. retaliation. The existence of three legs
provides^ in addition, an important hedge against the
?ossibility that a single Soviet technological break-
hrough could threaten our overall deterrent capability
To deter successfully all types of nuclear
attack- our forces as a whole must possess a number of
characteristics and capabilities--including surviv-
ability , prompt response , endurance . mission flexi -
bilityT anS sufficient accuracy and~ warhead yield--to
retaliate against hardened Soviet military targets
( emphasis added) . [ Ref. 10: p. 51J
Again, the emphasis on the ability to affect primarily coun-
termilitary retaliatory strikes and the fairly explicit
avoidance of a countervalue mission for U. S. strategic
nuclear forces is encountered on this official statement.
The strategic TRIAD consists of land based interconti-
nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long range strategic
bombers, and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
The composition of these forces, as of 1 January 1985, is
provided as Table I [ Ref s. 13,14,15: pp. 19, 291-292, 13-16]
.
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TABLE I
U. S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
ICBMs
Model Deployed Warheads
(total)
Yield(MT) CEP(nm)
Titan II
Minuteman
Minuteman
(Mkl2)
Minuteman
(Mkl2A)
II
III
III
30
450
250
300
30
450
750
900
9. 00
1.20
0. 17(ea)
0. 34(ea)
0. 70
0. 20
0. 12
0. 12
SLBMs
Model Deployed Warheads
(total)
Yield(MT) CEP(nm)
Poseidon
(C-3,C-4)
Trident C-•4
304
312
2736
2496
0. 04(ea)
0. lO(ea)
0. 25
0. 25
BOMBERS
Model Deployed Warheads
( each)
Yield(MT) CEP(nm)
B-52G ( a)
B-52H (b)
FB-111
167
96
61
4( bombs)
6 SRAMs
12 ALCMs
4( bombs)
2( SRAMs)
1. 00
0. 20
0. 20
1. 00
0. 20
0. 10 •
0. 20
0. 08
0. 10
0. 20
Notes:
( a) Short Ranq(b) Air LauncS
fe Attack Missiles.
Led Cruise Missiles.
Each leg of the strategic TRIAD possesses its own unique
advantages and limitations. Submarines, for example, repre-
sent a relatively invulnerable retaliatory force given their
operational environment and the current state-of-the-art in
Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW) [ Ref . 14: pp. 109-117]
.
However, they are not particularly well suited for retalia-
tory strikes against significantly hardened targets, due to
lesser accuracy in warhead delivery capability (measured by
"circular error probable" or "CEP") and relatively low
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weapon yields. Furthermore, the same operational environ-
ment which enhances their security also serves to exacerbate
the difficulties inherent in maintaining good shore to
submarine communications necessary for positive control.
Land-based strategic bombers, on the other hand, possess
the necessary characteristics for affecting non-urgent hard
target kills (HTKs) due to payload considerations (higher
yield weapons) and the ability of the platform to achieve a
great degree of accuracy in weapons delivery (low CEPs). In
addition, strategic bombers offer an attractive feature
through their recallability, a function not found in the
other components of the Triad. Successful completion of the
bomber mission, however, is predicated on the ability of the
bombers to get airborne quickly in the event of a suprise
attack and the ability to effect a penetration of hostile
airspace.
Land-based ICBMs are generally regarded as the best
system for achieving prompt hard target counterforce
strikes. ICBMs fulfill the characteristics and capabilities
of prompt response, accuracy and yield stipulated in the
Fiscal Year 1986 Annual Report . The goal of mission flexi-
bility is also achieved by these systems; utilization of
ICBMs in a retaliatory strike presents fewer command,
control and communications difficulties than the SLBM and
strategic bomber legs of the TRIAD. The chief disadvantage
associated with this weapons system, however, lies in its
stationary deployment mode and subsequent vulnerability to
attack by Soviet HTK ICBM systems. This would tend to raise
questions concerning the ability of U. S. ICBMs to meet the
requisite strategic force characteristics of survivability
and endurance, a point addressed in detail in this and
subsequent chapters.
The preceeding discussion suggests that the land-based
ICBM leg of the TRIAD possesses a qualitative superiority
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greater than that found in the remaining elements of the
U. S. strategic nuclear force structure in the execution of
countermilitary targeting plans. It is also possible to
substantiate this notion through quantitative analytical
methods. Particularly useful is the following technique for
modeling ballistic missile kill probabilities.
1. Countermilitary Potential of U.S. SNF
The probability that a single reliable warhead can
be expected to destroy a given target is a function of the
destructive effect of the warhead on the target and the
accuracy of the warhead, assuming ideal environmental
considerations and optimal height of burst (HOB) detonation.
[ Ref . 16: pp. 210-215] . This probability, known as the
"Single Shot Kill Probability" (SSKP), may be calculated by
the equation
SSKP = 1 - exp{(-5. 83Y2/3)/(H''- '(CEP2)) I, ( eqn 2.1)
where Y equals the weapon yield in megatons (MT), H the
hardness of the target in pounds per square inch (psi), and
CEP, or "circular error probable," represents the maximum
distance from the target where a given warhead will land
with a probability of fifty percent [Ref. 16: p. 214]
.
Using the performance data for U. S. strategic
nuclear forces provided in Table I and equation 2.1, the
SSKPs for the ICBM and SLBM elements of the TRIAD against
various levels of target hardness are derived and provided
as Table II. Since the present emphasis is on the ability to
affect prompt hard target kills, the strategic bomber force
elements are omitted from these calculations,
Davis and Schilling [Ref. 16: pp. 216-217] note that
the Single Shot Kill Probability is predicated on the
assumption that a warhead will arrive at its designated
target and detonate. This might not always be the case, as
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TABLE II
APPROXIMATE U. S. ICBM/SLBM SSKP DATA
ICBMs
Target Hardness (psi)
Model
5 1000 2000 3000 4000 6000
Titan II
Minuteman
Minuteman
( Mkl2
)
Minuteman
II
III
III
1.00
1.00
1. 00
1. 00
0. 34
0. 73
0.76
0.90
0.22
0, 55
0. 59
0. 75
0. 17
0. 45
0. 49
0. 65
0. 14
0. 39
0. 42
0. 58
0. 11
0. 31
0. 34
0.48
MX (proposed) ( a) 1.00 1. 00 1. 00 0.99 0.97 0. 93
SLBMs
Model
Poseidon
(C-3,C-4)
Trident C-4
0. 99
1.00
0. 10
0. 16
0. 06
0. 10
0.05
0. 08
0. 04
0.06
0. 03
0.05
Notes:
( a) Based on Warhead Yield of . 35MT, CEP o f 0. 05 nm.
there are many points of possible failure during a ballistic
missile's flight. Therefore, to accurately estimate the
actual probability of target kill, or Terminal Kill
Probability (TKP), the Overall Reliability (OAR) given
missile system must be taken into consideration. OAR repre-
sents the composite probability that the missile system will
not sustain a debilitating malfunction during the countdown
and launch, flight, reentry vehicle busing, atmospheric
penetration, and warhead detonation phases of the missile's
operational profile (denoted by the subscripts l,f,b,r, and
d, respectively, in equation 2.2 below).
Since these five separate phases of a ballistic
missile's flight profile represent mutually exclusive
probabilistic events (i.e., total failure at any given phase
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precludes the delivery of a reliable warhead on target), the
OAR is determined by taking the product of the reliabilities
of the previously mentioned missile mission elements ( "R" )
,
or
OAR = (Ri)(Rf)(Rb)(Rr)(Rd)- (eqn2.2)
A missile system enjoying a 95 percent reliability in each
of the above phases, for example, would have an OAR of
(.95)^, or approximately 77 percent.
Terminal Kill Probability (TKP) is calculated by
taking the product of the SSKPs and OARs for each delivery
system. Table III combines the SSKP data in Table II with an
arbitrarily high OAR value of 90 percent (equivalent to 98
percent reliability per phase) to provide TKP values for
U. S. stirategic nuclear delivery systems at near perfect
levels of system performance against targets of varying
hardness.
Expected value theory [ Ref . 17: p. 125] provides a
means for evaluating the ability of U. S. SNF assets to
affect kills against hardened military targets. For
example, assuming a uniform availability rate of 100 percent
for alerted U. S. ICBM forces and an estimated average Soviet
ICBM silo hardness of 3000 psi [Ref. 18: p. 22] , the respec-
tive total U. S. ICBM warhead ( less the MX) and 3000 psi TKP
data in Tables I and III would yield a value of (30)(.15) +
(450)(.41) + (750)(.44) + (900)(.59), or 1051 viable HTK
ICBM warheads for the U. S. in an uncontested exchange. This
methodology and the data in Tables I and III may be used to
evaluate , the effectiveness of U. S, SNFs against various
combinations of target hardness and U. S. force availability
rates.
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TABLE III
APPROXIMATE U. S. ICBM/SLBM TKP DATA
ICBMs
Target Hardness (psi)
Model
5 1000 2000 3000 4000 6000
Titan II
Minuteman II
Minuteman III
( Mkl2
)
Minuteman III
(Mkl2A)
MX (proposed)
0.90
0. 90
0. 90
0.31
0. 66
0. 68
0. 20
0. 50
0. 53
0. 15
0.41
0. 44
0. 13
0. 35
0. 38
0. 10
0. 28
0. 31
0. 90 0. 81 0. 68 0. 59 0.52 0.43
0.90 0. 90 0. 90 0. 89 0. 87 0. 84
SLBMs
Model
Poseidon
?C-3,C-4)
Trident C-4
0.89
0. 90
0.09
0. 14
0. 05
0. 09
0. 05
0.07
0. 04
0.05
0. 03
0.05
C. SOVIET DOCTRINE
A general understanding of the strategic doctrine of the
Soviet Union is essential in the development of appropriate
strategies designed to countervail Soviet ambitions.
Doctrinal considerations provide the impetus for accquisi-
tion of force structures and employment policies best suited
for the attainment of the overall Soviet goals and objec-
tives. When equipped with this knowledge, the analyst is
better prepared to establish the actual intent of the Soviet
strategic planning process. This approach is superior to an
alternative methodology of estimating strategic intent by
simply examining raw military potential.
Due to the cloistered nature of Soviet society, efforts
to ascertain the composition and objectives of Soviet
nuclear strategy are equally (if not more) susceptible to
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the conceptual and historical confusions encountered in a
comparable study of U. S. doctrine. Nevertheless, a great
many authoritative works have been written on the subject;
this section presents a brief compilation of the fundamental
attributes of Soviet strategic nuclear policy on which
Soviet experts have reached a general consensus.
First, Soviet interpretations of deterrence theory are
predominately divergent from the U. S. viewpoint. This diver-
gence may in part be attributed to certain conceptual
dilemmas. For example, Holloway notes that the term "deter-
rence" has no precise Russian language equivalent and is
subject to two entirely different translations:
Of these two terms it is sderzhivanie , restraining or
holding back, that is used to describe Soviet policy;
when ustrashenie , intimidation, is used it is applied to
Western policy. The fact that the same Russian word can
denote both containment' and 'deterrence underlines
the point that deterrence is conceived of more broadly
in the Soviet Union than in the West . wEere it is often
seen solely in terms of the balance of arrangements
between the two sides (emphasis added) . nfReF! 191 p. 33J
Nor are translational difficulties themselves the sole
contributors to conceptual confusion. While it is true that
a fundamental role of Soviet strategic nuclear forces is the
deterrence of an attack on the Soviet Union, analyses of
Soviet military and political literature provide no evidence
suggesting an acceptance of the notion of "mutual restraint"
inherent in Western interpretations of deterrence theory
[ Ref . 14: p. 185] . The Soviets do not view deterrence as a
bilateral mechanism which provides them with incentives to
pursue policies stressing conflict avoidance. This contrast
with the Western emphasis on war prevention, according to
Ermarth, is primarily due to the "military underpinnings of
a, foreign policy that has both offensive and defensive
goals " (emphasis added). [Ref. 9: p. 602] In short, Soviet
nuclear policy seeks " not simply to deter an attack on the
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USSR but to intimidate the opponent to the point of para-
lyzing his will to resist Soviet geopolitical advances "
(emphasis added). [ Ref . 14: p. 186]
Second, the Soviets explicitly reject the Western deter-
rent paradigms of mutual vulnerability and societal punish-
ment. While the Soviets acknowledge the potentially vast
destruction associated with nuclear warfare, they are
equally cognizant of the great countermilitary potential
inherent in nuclear weaponry and have developed " a concept
of victory that includes regime maintenance, recovery and
reconstruction, and the destruction of U.S. war-waging
potential as the immediate essential criteria for victory "
(emphasis added). [Ref. 7: p. 127] Soviet military and
political literature is replete with examples suggesting the
advocacy of a nuclear warfighting strategy that is predomi-
nately (but not exclusively) counterforce in its orienta-
tion. Consider the following representative quote from the
thrid edition of Military Strategy ( 1968) by Soviet Marshal
V. D. Sokolovskiy:
Military strategy under conditions of modern war becomes
the strategy of deep nuclear rocket strikes in conjunc-
tion with the operations of all services of the armed
forces to effect a simultaneous defeat and destruction
of the economic potential and armed forces throughput
tHe enemy territory . thus accompTTshinq the war aims
within a short time period (emphasis added). [ Ref. 20:
p. 291]
Finally, Soviet doctrine stresses the criticality of
achieving strategic surprise through massive, preemptive
attacks. The Soviet view of a successful first strike is one
in which the United States is caught unaware, and has as its
key objective the destruction of the bulk of U. S. strategic
forces to preclude the possibility of a coordinated counter-
strike [Ref. 21: p. 6] . Miller describes the historical
precedence for this strategy of massive preemption:
As assiduous students of military history, the Soviets
are certainly aware of the fact that the key to victory
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in coalition warfare has always been the destruction of
tHe military capabilities of the most powerful member .
Given the Soviet style of warfare, and given the leader-
ship s visceral reluctance to rely on the philantrophy
of the enemy, it is most unlikely that if limited
options are part o? tHe Soviet nuclear repertoire" they
resemble the warning shots . 3emonstration strikes, and
highly selective targeting associated with American
limited nuclear options ? LNOT! Rather, the Soviet
version oT limited options almost assuredly would
conform to the dual imperatives of achieving a quick and
decisive result and reducing tHe enemy ' s ability to
inflict~ damage on the homeland ( emphasoTs addedTT
IRef. 14: pp7226-2T7]
Therefore, the Western model of deterrence which most
closely approximates the intent of Soviet strategic nuclear
doctrine is that of the prevailing strategy . Accordingly,
the Soviets have conducted an ongoing expansion and modern-
ization of their strategic nuclear force structure to
fulfill the primary objective of this strategic paradigm:
the imposition of military defeat on the West while simulta-
neously securing the achievement of Soviet political goals
and objectives.
D. SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
In order to complicate attack planning and to widen the
spectrum of available warfighting options, the strategic
nuclear forces of the Soviet Union are arranged in a struc-
ture roughly analogous to the U. S. TRIAD. The composition
of these forces, as of 1 January 1985, is provided as Table
IV [Refs. 13,14,15: p. 19, 291-292 , 13-16]
.
1. Countermilitary Potential of Soviet SNF
The methodology employed in the previous section for
evaluating the countermilitary potential of U. S. SNFs enjoys
equal validity in the Soviet case. Tables V and VI,
respectively, provide single shot kill and terminal kill
probability values ( assuming an arbitrary 90 percent overall
reliability) for Soviet ballistic missile systems.
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TABLE IV
SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
ICBMs
Model Deployed Warheads(total)
Yield(MT) CEP(nm)
SS-11
SS-13
SS-17
SS-18
SS-19
520
60
150
308
360
520
60
600
3080
2160
1. 00
0. 60
0. 75(ea)
0. 50 ea)
0. 55(ea)
0. 76
0. 82
0. 24
0. 12
0. 14
SLBMs
Model Deployed Warheads
( total)
Yield(MT) CEP(nm)
SS-N-5
SS-N-6
SS-N-8
SS-N-17
SS-N-18
SS-N-20 ( a)
45
336
292
12
224
60
45
672
292
12
672
840
1.00
0. 75(ea)
0.80
0. 75
0. 20( ea)
0. 20(ea;i
1.50
1.00
0.84
0. 25
0. 76
0.25
BOMBERS
Model Deployed Warheads
( each)
Yield(MT) CEP(nm)
BEAR
BISON
BACKFIRE (b)
120
45
230
4
4
2
.
1.00
1. 00
1.00
0. 20
0.20
0.10
Notes:
(a) SLBMs carried on TYPHOON class
(b) Includes Soviet strategic and
SSBNs.
naval aviation assets.
Using the previously described technique of expected
values along with assumptions of 100 percent availability
for Soviet Strategic Rocket Force (SRF) ICBMs and an average
U.S. ICBM silo hardness of 2000 psi [ Ref s. 18,22: pp. 22,412]
the respective total warhead and 2000 psi TKP data in Tables
IV and VI would yield a value of (520) (.05) + (60)(.03) +
(600)(.34) + (3080)(.75) + (2160)(.56), or 3752 viable HTK
ICBM warheads for the Soviets in an uncontested exchange.
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TABLE V
APPROXIMATE SOVIET ICBM/SLBM SSKP DATA
ICBMs
Target Hardness (psi)
Model
1 1000 2000 3000
SS-11
SS-13
SS-17
SS-18
SS-19
0. 96
0.86
1.00
1. 00
1.00
0. 08
0.05
0.54
0. 95
0. 79
0. 05
0.03
0. 33
0. 83
0.62
0. 04
0. 03
0. 30
0. 74
0.51
SLBMs
Model
SS-N-5
SS-N-5
SS-N-8
SS-N-17
SS-N-18
SS-N-20
0. 57
0. 79
0. 90
1. 00
0. 67
1. 00
0. 02
0. 04
0. 05
0. 47
0. 03
0.23
0. 01
0. 02
0. 03
0. 33
0. 02
0. 15
0. 01
0. 02
0. 03
0.26
0. 01
0. 11
E. SUMMARY
Three important conclusions may be derived from this
chapter. First, an analysis of official policy statements by
U. S. leadership substantiates the hypothesis that the United
States does not adhere to the doctrine of mutual vulner-
ability in the formulation of its nuclear strategy. While
the concept of mutual vulnerability might possess a certain
intellectual appeal, U. S. declaratory nuclear policies are
in reality decidedly counterforce in their orientation. This
doctrinal predisposition towards a strategy emphasizing
"countervailing options" has produced a nuclear force struc-
ture that is primarily designed for the flexible execution
of countermilitary as opposed to countervalue missions.
Second, the Soviet Union has unequivocally rejected the
notions of mutual restraint and assured vulnerability
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TABLE V][
APPROXIMATE SOVIET ICBM/SLBM TKP DATA
ICBMs
Target Hardness (psi)
1 1000 2000 3000
Model
SS--11 0. 86 0. 07 0. 05 0. 04
SS--13 0. 77 0. 05 0. 03 0. 02
SS--17 0. 90 0. 49 0. 34 0. 27
SS--18 0. 90 0. 86 0. 75 0. 67
SS--19 0. 90 0. 71 0. 56 0. 46
SLBMs
Model
SS-N-5 0. 51 0. 02 0. 01 0. 01
SS--N-6 0. 71 0. 04 0. 02 0. 02
SS--N-8 0. 81 0. 05 0. 03 0. 03
SS--N-17 0. 90 0. 42 0. 30 0. 23
SS--N-18 0. 60 0. 03 0. 02 0. 01
SS-•N-20 0. 90 0. 21 0. 14 0. 10
inherent in Western deterrence theory. The Soviets see
deterrence as a mechanism which diminishes the probability
of a U. S. attack while facilitating a paralysis of the
Western will to resist Soviet expansionist tendencies.
Furthermore, Soviet strategy has enjoyed a remarkable conti-
nuity unparalleled in the West, with consistent emphasis on
the classic Clausewitzian principles of mass and economy of
force, as well as the attainment of strategic surprise
through preemption [ Ref . 9: p. 605]
.
Third, a cursory examination of the countermilitary
potential of both the United States and Soviet strategic
nuclear forces indicates a decided Soviet advantage in reli -
able HTK capable ICBMs (3752:1051, or 3.6:1). Although the
assumptions used in the expected value methodology included
several artificialities (high OARs and near perfect system
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availability), the implications of this imbalance on the
viability of U. S. SNF, particularly that of the ICBM force,
are severe. This point will be examined further in the
following chapters.
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III. STRATEGIC DEFENSE FOR COUNTERFORCE ENHANCEMENT
A. OBJECTIVES FOR STRATEGIC DEFENSE
An initial requirement of the measures of effectiveness
methodology is the identification of alternative approaches
for reaching a specified objective. Accordingly, this
chapter begins with a review of several possible objectives
for a system of strategic defense. Bowman [ Ref . 23: p. 871]
identifies four:
(1) to replace a policy of deterrence by threat of retal-iation with a policy of assured survival based on a
near-perfect defense against all types of offensive
nuclear weapons;
(2) to enhance deterrence by reducing the vulnerability
of U. S. retaliatory offensive forces;
(3) to create a first strike capability by effectively
shielding against the small residual Soviet force
left following U. S. preemption; and
(4) to limit damage by reducing the number of penetrating
Soviet warheads, should deterrence fail.
Each of these objectives represents a differing strategic
approach for conflict management, ranging from total defense
dominance to varying mixes of offensive and defensive capa-
bilities. Additionally, each objective carries with it a
unique set of technological and political challenges. The
issue at hand is the identification of the objective best
suited to the declaratory goals of U. S. nuclear strategy.
Objective (1) may be clearly interpreted as a defense
dominant approach. Pursuit of policies, systems and technol-
ogies conforming to this objective would acknowledge mutu-
ally assured vulnerability as the preeminent deterrent
paradigm in the U. S. -Soviet relationship. By definition,
systems of strategic defense designed to fulfill this objec-
tive would have to be "near-perfect" in order to preclude
any possibility of incurring massive societal punishment
from any type of nuclear delivery system. The immensity of
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the technological challenge associated with such a task is
readily apparent.
The political implications of this strategy are equally
formidable. First, this approach would necessitate the
unilateral elimination of offensive strategic nuclear capa-
bilities from the U. S. arsenals. Bowman explains the
rationale for this requirement:
Otherwise ^ a nation protected behind such a shield could
threaten its neighbors in the world community with impu-
nity, even with a small number of nuclear weapons. If a
nation attempted to complete such a system while
retaining offensive weapons, the other nations would
never allow it, but would attempt to destroy the shield
before it was complete or launch a preemptive attack.
[Ref. 23: p. 872]
While the historical record would tend to support the notion
that an inexplicably sudden adoption of a malevolent posture
by the United States toward the international community is
very unlikely, the implications of this scenario on Soviet
grand strategy are obvious. Xhe Soviets might perceive such
a development as reflective of U. S. desires to actually
accquire a potentially viable nuclear war-fighting/war-
winning posture. In addition, the transition from the
current offense dominant strategy to the defense dominant
strategy embodied in objective (1) would have to be very
carefully orchestrated indeed so that at no time would the
offensive/defensive mix create the situation found in objec-
tive (3): the capability for a disarming first strike
[Refs. 23,24: pp.871, 824-825].
Finally, objective (1) would be tantamount to a rejec-
tion of deterrence as the cornerstone of U. S. strategic
doctrine. The declatory policies of the United States
stress the prevention of warfare at all levels of the spec-
trum of conflict through the mechanism of deterrence.
According to Defense Secretary Weinberger's FY87 Annual
Report [Ref. 11: p. 39] , deterrence is a multilayered concept
comprised of the following components:
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• Defense ; if the adversary calculates his aggression is
likely to fail in its own terms, he will not attack;
• Escalation : the adversary must know that even if his
aggression should succeed in achieving its immediate
objectives, he faces the threat of escalation to
hostilities that would exact a higher cost than he is
willing to pay; and
• Retaliation ; if the adversary confronts a credible
threat that aggression will trigger attacks by a
surviving U. S. retaliatory capability against the
attacker s vital interests that result in losses
exceeding any possible gains, he will not attack.
The strategic nuclear forces of the United States play an
integral role in the actualization of these processes. The
requisite removal of these forces as specified in objective
(1) to assuage international suspicions of a developing U.S.
nuclear war-winning capability would effectively terminate
the viability of the second and third aspects of deterrence.
Furthermore, this totally passive, defense dominant posture
would require absolute confidence in the effectiveness of
the defenses deployed, thereby placing an unprecedented
burden on the first mechanism. Taken together, these two
factors would likely render the entire deterrent process
impotent.
Conversely, objectives (3) and (4) are representative of
approaches which seek to establish a mix of offensive and
defensive strategic capabilities. It is arguably correct
that sound military judgement dictates the pursuit of force
structures containing a well balanced offensive/defensive
mix. It is equally true that the technological demands on
defensive systems outlined for these objectives are signifi-
cantly less and more readily obtainable than those required
for objective (1). The issue with objectives (3) and (4),
however, is not one of technological feasibility but rather
one of domestic and international political implications.
First, the development of policies, systems and technol-
ogies conforming to objectives (3) and (4) might be legiti-
mately construed as the advocacy of a posture designed to
fulfill the objectives of nuclear war-fighting or perhaps
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even war-winning strategies. Pursuit of these objectives
would be appropriate if the paradigm of the prevailing
strategy, with its emphasis on victory as opposed to denial ,
is truly representative of U. S. strategic goals. Since this
is not the case, adoption of this posture would be diametri-
cally opposed to the stated intent of U. S. strategic nuclear
policies and would have serious ramifications at the
domestic political level. Even the most cursory review of
official U. S. policy statements yields a collection of docu-
ments replete with phrases reflecting the national sentiment
on the topic of nuclear conflict and reiterating the theme
that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.
"
[Ref. 11: p. 14]
Furthermore, historical observations of the post-war
period lend additional credence to the rejection of the
preemptive strategy as a viable option in U. S. nuclear
doctrine. Although the "nuclear option" was reportedly
considered twenty times in successive presidential adminis-
trations since 1945, the United States obviously did not
choose to exercise this option [Ref. 25: p. 626] . If
anything, the likelihood of a Presidential order initiating
the nuclear option has declined over the past decade
[Ref. 8: p. 588] .
The development of the defensive strategies and systems
delineated in these two approaches would also have grave
perceptual implications for the continued security of the
Western Alliance. Gray and Payne note that despite its
shortcomings, the current offensive dominant nuclear posture
of the United States remains central to the NATO doctrine of
"flexible response" and the concept of "enhanced deter-
rence. " [Ref. 24: p. 829] Even though the defensive tran-
sitions envisaged in objectives (3) and (4) would still
provide the U. S. with an offensive/defensive force mix with
potent retaliatory capabilities, it is unlikely that
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America's European allies would welcome such a development.
Two basic arguments support this hypothesis.
In the first place, it is extremely unlikely that the
Soviet Union would permit a unilateral deployment of stra-
tegic defenses by the United States designed to facilitate
the execution of either preemptive or damage- limiting strat-
egies. Since the Soviets have long recognized the utility of
strategic defenses in the conduct of offensive operations,
it is most likely that the Soviet Union would seek to match
(if not actually exceed) U.S. defensive capabilities when
confronted with (or anticipating) this situation [ Ref . 26:
pp. 20-22]. The resulting bilateral deployment of comparable
systems of strategic defense by both superpowers would still
leave the Soviet Union with a clear advantage in counter-
force capabilities. In the face of effective Soviet
defenses, the U. S. "nuclear umbrella" associated with the
doctrines of "flexible response" and "extended deterrence"
would appear less threatening and might well compel
America's European allies to seek "alternative means of
preserving their security. " [ Ref. 24: p. 830] Achievement of
these "alternative means" could only come about as the
result of an unprecedented expansion of NATO's conventional
and nuclear offensive and defensive capabilities. An exami-
nation of the historical record has shown this choice to be
decidedly unpalatable from a European viewpoint [Ref. 27:
pp. 628-629] .
Secondly, the nations of the Western Alliance are faced
with a wider spectrum of potential threats than the United
States:
A BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) system that effec-
tively protected the United States and its European
allies from strategic nuclear attack would still leave
the Europeans vulnerable to conventional and some kinds
of nuclear attack. This assymetry in vulnerabilities,
and hence the perception of an assymetry in American and
European interests, could be exacerbated by a new U. S.
defensive policy (emphasis added). [Ref. 24: p. 830]
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Moreover, a bilateral defensive transition by both super-
powers towards the offensive/defensive mixes stipulated in
objectives (3) and (4) would effectively diminish the
utility of the strategic nuclear forces of the "small"
nuclear powers:
A defensive transition by both superpowers would also
degrade, perhaps nullify, the British and French inde-
pendent strategic deterrents. Ijt was clear during the
SALT J. negotiations that the British anS French wantedBMP iTmited to very low levels so that their relatively
smal"r~indepen5ent nuclear fprces would retain effective -
ness . There is little to indicate that the British pr
French have a different perspective today ( emphasis
added). "TRef.~24: p. S30J
In brief, the varying degrees of technological and
political difficulties associated with the defensive tran-
sitions specified in objectives (1), (3) and (4) are exten-
sive and have many potentially undesirable consequences.
These dilemmas hold equally well in scenarios that seek a
less than total defensive transition as in those that seek
absolute defence dominance. This is not the case, however,
with Bowman's second objective: using strategic defenses to
enhance deterrence.
B. STRATEGIC DEFENSE TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE
The use of strategic defense to enhance the deterrence
process enjoys viability as a strategic option for the very
same reasons that the alternative approaches do not.
Deterrence has ostensibly been implemented through the adop-
tion of a variety of strategic paradigms throughout the
evolution of U. S. strategic doctrine. As was demonstrated in
Chapter II, the stipulations of the countervailing strategy
best reflect the true intent of U. S. nuclear policies and
programs at present. Nevertheless, the concept of deter-
rence itself has in one form or another remained the corner-
stone of United States strategic doctrine for over forty
years. Thus, the issue becomes one of how to best fortify an
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established and proven concept as well as provide a "hedge"
against the possible failure of the deterrence process.
There is little if any serious contention that deter-
rence has not achieved its single overriding objective: the
prevention of a direct superpower clash across the entirety
of the spectrum of conflict. It is reasonable to assume
that the immediate and quite possibly long term future will
not witness an intentional departure by the United States
from this position. Therefore, any serious effort by the
United States to develop a truly meaningful system of stra-
tegic defense must first meet the criteria of deterrence
enhancement.
The emphasis in the preceeding paragraphs, however, is
on the avoidance of defensive strategies which might facili-
tate an intentional U. S. departure from the deterrence
process. Several trends are apparent in the current
U. S. -Soviet strategic nuclear "balance" which might serve as
potential catalysts of an unintentional divestiture of the
deterrence process by the United States. The burgeoning
Soviet capability for conducting effective preemptive coun-
terforce strikes could conceivably force the U. S. to adopt a
preemptive strategy of its own in crisis situations. In
particular, substantial evidence has accrued suggesting that
certain elements of the strategic TRIAD, most notably the
land-based ICBM force, have become increasingly vulnerable
to a preemptive Soviet counterforce strike. The eventual
development of this situation was officially recognized
several years ago by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in
the Fiscal Year 1981 Annual Report ;
Within a year or two, we can expect (the Soviets) to
obtain the necessary combination of ICBM numbers. reli-
ability, accuracy and warhead yield to put most of our
Minuteman and Titan silos at risk from an attack with a
relatively small portion of their ICBM force .... We
must assume that the ICBM leg of our Triad could be
destroyed within a very short time as one result of a
Soviet surprise attack. [ Ref . 28: p. 21]
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A cursory examination of the hard target kill (HTK) capabil-
ities of the current Soviet ICBM order-of-battle ( Tables
IV, V and VI) clearly indicates that the vulnerability
predicted less than a decade ago has been transformed into a
strategic reality. It is also apparent that the" burgeoning
Soviet capability to effect prompt destruction of hardened
U. S. ICBM silos poses an equally potent threat to the
survivability of a substantial portion of the remaining legs
of the TRIAD (i.e., strategic bombers and inport SSBNs).
The implications of this growing disparity in the
U. S. -Soviet strategic balance on the continued vitality of
the deterrence process are severe. According to the Fiscal
Year 1987 Annual Report [ Ref . 11: pp. 33-34] , an effective
deterrent must meet four tests:
Survivability : forces must be able to survive a
pr(
losses that outweigh gains;
'^
reemptive attack with sufficient strength to threaten
• Credibility : threatened responses to an attack must be
of a form ^that the potential aggressor believes could
and would be carried out;
• Clarity : actions to be deterred must be sufficiently
clear so the potential aggressor knows and recognizes
what is prohibited; and
• Safety : failures due to accidents, unauthorized use,
and miscalculations must be minimized.
However, the increasing leverage manifested in the current
Soviet ICBM order-of battle seriously jeopardizes the
ability of the U. S. land-based ICBM force to successfully
meet the preceeding criteria . This leverage may be qualita-
tively and quantitatively demonstrated with the use of a
simple dynamic counterforce exchange model.
C. SOVIET COUNTERFORCE SCENARIO
A common shortcoming associated with many dynamic
nuclear exchange models is their failure to conduct a real-
istic assessment of the targeting objectives of the
aggressor force. Accordingly, this section commences with a
review of the representative literature dealing with the
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war- fighting objectives of the Soviet Union as a precursor
to the development of a plausible Soviet counterforce first
strike scenario.
1. Soviet Targeting Considerations
The analysis of Soviet strategic doctrine in Chapter
II established the prevailing strategy as the comparable
Western paradigm which best approximated the overall objec-
tives of Soviet grand strategy. Since the prevailing
strategy stresses the imposition of military defeat while
simultaneously seeking the achievement of the aggressor's
goals as its primary objective, it is not surprising that
Soviet nuclear targeting has objectives which conform with
that approach. Deane identifies two:
Soviet targeting has two general objectives that are
consistent with the intent of attaining victory over
the opponent. The first is the greatest possible
destruction of enemy military forces, especially the
enemy' s strategic nuclear capabilities second is the
destruction of selected key pplitical and economic
targets as a means both to inhibit the enemy's ability
to sustain a protracted war effort and to overcome the
population's will to resist (emphasis added). [ Ref . 26:
pp. 17-18]
A plausible target set representative of Soviet
objectives in a nuclear conflict would thus adopt the
general schema developed by Frank [Ref. 29: pp. 12-13]
:
• Destruction of enemy nuclear attack capabilities;
• Destruction or disruption of enemy troop basing
systems;
• Destruction of enemy military-industrial support facil-
ities;
• Destruction or disruption of enemy rear services and
transport facilities.
Identification of the offensive tactics most likely
to be employed in the fulfillment of Soviet targeting objec-
tives is a more demanding task, Sound military logic would
dictate that a prudent Soviet planner not anticipate an
overwhelming attrition of U. S. strategic nuclear assets with
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an initial Soviet salvo. Taking this logic one step further,
Soviet planners must also not discount the possibility of a
totally countervalue oriented "spasm" U. S. retaliatory
attack. Despite the relatively low probabilities associated
with these two events, the Soviets would nevertheless do
well to take them into consideration.
Therefore, Soviet planners may be expected to draw
primarily from two tactical options in their repertoire.
Miller explains the rationale for the first choice:
The only plausible way to achieve a substantial increase
in attrition would be for the Soviets to strike before
U. S. forces were placed on high alert; that is, in a
period of less than extreme tension . This suggests two
oossible scenarios. The first, and most obvious, is the
oolt-out-of-the-blue attack . in the absence of capabil-
ities that have an extraordinary damage limitation
potential, such an action must rank at the extreme low
end of the probability scale. Indeed, a strong and
confident Soviet Union is less likely to consider
nuclear war than is a weakened and desparate one
( ephasis aHHed) L Ref. 14: p. 216J
.
Miller concludes the analysis by positing the more likely
Soviet nuclear option:
The more likely scenario. then, is some calamity faced
by the Soviets, the full military implications of which
were unappreciated in the West. If, for instance, the
leadership was confronted with severe internal disloca-
tions at home or within the bloc, coupled with declining
confidence in its ability to uphold its end of the
superpower competition, it would certainly be willing to
take grave measures to salvage its crumbling position.
The formidable counterforce capabilities the Soviets
will have by the mid-1980s coula be especially destabi -
lizing anddangerous in tliis kind o7 situation . IndeeH ,
the Kremlin might feel^sorely pressed to act decisively
.m order to neutralize American power~5efore Washington
moveH to achieve some fundamental advantage . . .
.
The
possibiTTty that the Soviet leadership is susceptible to
such a now- or-never mentali^ should, not be dismissed
precipitously (emphasis added). I Ref . 14: pp. 215-217J
A final consideration in the development of Soviet
targeting objectives is addressed with a brief examination
of the following concepts: strategic reserves and economy
of force. As assiduous students of classical military
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strategy, the Soviets have long recognized the necessity for
holding sizeable, secure strategic forces in reserve during
the course of battle [ Ref . 14: p. 149] . This penchant for
the maintenance of large reserve forces is wholly consistent
with Soviet expectations of a protracted nuclear conflict
with the United States [ Ref s. 5,4: pp. 42,612]. In addition,
emphasis on the military principle of economy of force
exerts a significant influence on Soviet target planning;
random applications of violent force are generally regarded
as anathema to the Soviet strategic culture [Ref. 9: p. 505] .
Taken together, these targeting considerations would
produce the initial Soviet nuclear salvo envisaged by
Miller: approximately 2500 prompt counterforce warheads with
an equivalent megatonnage of roughly 1500MT of explosive
power [Ref. 14: p. 227]. The hypothetical Soviet first-
strike examined in the subsequent section approximates this
scenario scenario quite closely.
2. A Hypothetical Soviet Counterforce Model
The following model illustrates the likely composi-
tion of a Soviet counterforce strike consistent with the
targeting objectives developed in the preceeding sections.
Accordingly, the scenario places great emphasis on attaining
an attack disposition necessary to achieve the overriding
goal of a Soviet first strike: the effective neutralization
of retaliatory U. S. nuclear capabilities embodied in the
land-based ICBM, strategic bomber, and non-deployed SSBN
elements of the TRIAD. Several qualifications, however, are
in order.
To begin with, the scenario assumes that U. S. stra-
tegic nuclear contingency planning documents (i.e. , the
Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP) explicitly
disavow either launch-on-warning (LOW) or launch-under-
attack (LUA) policies as legitimate nuclear options. This
assumption is not altogether without foundation as the
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current warning and surveillance network deployed by the
U. S. is not sufficiently adequate in sensitivity to provide
a comfortable basis for the adoption of these policies
[ Ref . 7: p. 172] . Furthermore, LOW or LUA policies would
mandate the delegation of nuclear release authority, a func-
tion exclusively associated with the highest levels of U. S.
political leadership, considerably further down the National
Command Authority (NCA) chain of command [Ref. 7: p. 175]
.
The model therefore assumes that the U. S. strategic nuclear
forces would be opted into "riding-out" an initial Soviet
assualt.
Second, although the model stresses destruction of
significantly hardened U.S. retaliatory assets (ICBMs), the
less hardened elements of the TRIAD ( inport SSBNs, Bombers)
are also included in the scenario. The rationale for this
decision is derived from a synthesis of Soviet targeting
objectives with expected Soviet ICBM performance. Since
Soviet strategic doctrine emphasizes both the expeditious
destruction of all U. S. SNF and the military significance of
qualitatively superior weaponry [Ref. 14: pp. 195-200] , it is
logical to conclude that the Soviets would commit their most
modern and capable ballistic missile systems (i.e., the
SS-18 M0D4) in the execution of the attack plan. Even
though the use of HTK ICBMs to destroy "soft" targets might
appear "wasteful" from a Western perspective, it is never-
theless consistent with Soviet strategic thought. This
tactic would guarantee the Soviets sufficient military
leverage necessary to seize the highly sought-after "initia-
tive," and must therefore not be dismissed as a viable
option [Ref. 9: p. 608] .
Third, the scenario does not include Soviet attack
options associated with the destruction or disruption of
other military targets (OMT) delineated in the previous
section. Examples of candidate OMT sets likely to be found
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in Soviet targeting plans include U. S. SNF command, control
and communications ( C3 ) nodes, early warning and detection
facilities, national command links, SSBN communications
facilities and major military headquarters, to list a few
[ Ref . 29: pp. 12-13] . Two considerations support the inten-
tional omission of OMT target sets from the scenario. The
first, and perhaps most obvious, is the sheer size of the
data base which a thorough compilation of potential OMT sets
would assume. The second consideration is a function of the
resiliency of the OMTs. Since the bulk of the OMT target set
has little or no nuclear resistance ( i. e. , the ability to
withstand greater than 10 psi of blast overpressure), it is
most likely that their prompt destruction would be relegated
to the Soviet SSBN force. An examination of the Soviet SSBN
order-of-battle and systems performance data (Tables IV, V,
and VI) indicates that these forces are more than capable
for the execution of OMT attack plans.
After integrating the preceeding qualifications into
the dynamic modeling process, a hypothetical Soviet counter-
force strike assumes the disposition depicted in Table VII.
The scenario allocates two SS-18 warheads per target salvoed
at a rate designed to ensure adequate temporal separation
between warheads arriving at their respective designated
ground zeroes (DGZs). This separation serves to minimize the
possible fratracidal effects associated with two-on-one
targeting scenarios. Substantial evidence exists suggesting
that the Soviets are well aware of this phenomenon and have
developed the requisite command and control capabilites to
surmount this potential obstacle to attack success [Ref. 30:
pp. 20-21] .
Table VI (see Chapter II) illustrated the potential
hard and soft target kill capabilities of the Soviet ICBM
and SLBM systems as a function of their respective terminal
kill probabilities (TKPs). These values, however, are
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TABLE VII
SOVIET FIRST STRIKE SCENARIO
207 SS-18 M0D4S, 10 WARHEADS EACH (a)
Target Hardness Total Targets Warheads Used
ICBM LCCs (b) 2000 psi 133 256
Titan II ^ 33 66
Minuteman II " 450 900
Minuteman III " 250 500
ifMk-12)
Minuteman III " 300 600
(Mk-12A)
SSBN BASES 5 psi 3 6
SAC BASES (c) 5 psi 16 32
Totals N/A 1035 2070
Notes:
(a) Yield = 0. 35MT; CEP = 0. 12nm,
(b) Launch Control Centers.
(c) Strategic Air Command bases with alert aircraft.
artificially inflated by the inclusion of an arbitrarily
high overall reliability (OAR) of 90 percent in the TKP
calculus. In the interest of achieving greater operational
fidelity in evaluating the effectiveness of this scenario, a
more realistic OAR value of . 77 is incorporated into the
determination of SS-18 TKPs. This is analogous to individual
ICBM mission phase reliabilities of 95 percent. The revised
data is provided as Table VIII.
The scenario's provision of adequate temporal sepa-
ration between arriving warheads permits the viewing of each
warhead's attack performance as probabilistically indepen-
dent events. With this qualification, the probability that
a given target escapes destruction by either the first or
second warhead (but not both) is determined by the equation
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TABLE VIII
REVISED SOVIET SS-18 TKP DATA
Target Hardness (psi)
5 1000 2000 3000
TKP 0.77 0.73 0.64 0.57
surv
= 1 - {P(WHi) + P(WH2) - P(WHlnWH2)>, (eqn 3. 1)
where the random variables WHl and WH2 represent the respec-
tive target kill probabilities of the first and second
warheads [ Ref . 31: p. 24] . Substitution of the appropriate
SS-18 TKP values into equation 3. 1 yields overall survival
probabilities of . 05 for targets hardened to 5 psi and . 13
for targets hardened to 2000 psi/ assjaming P(WHl) equals
P(WH2).
The statistical technique for determining the
expected value of a discrete random variable may now be used
to determine the lethality of the hypothetical Soviet coun-
terforce strike [Ref. 17: p. 125} . Application of the
overall target survival probabilities to the numerology of
the attack scenario (Table VII) in accordance with the
expected value methodology facilitates the determination of
the post-attack composition of the targeted U. S. SNFs as an
MCE of the Soviet strike. The result of this process is
provided as Table IX:
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TABLE IX
POST ATTACK COMPOSITION OF U.S. SNF (UNDEFENDED)
Target Pre-attack Post-attack (a)
ICBM LCCs
Titan II
Minuteman II
Minuteman III
(Mk-12)
Minuteman III
(Mk-12A)
SSBN BASES
SAC BASES
133 17
33 4
450 59
250 98
300 117
3
16 1
Notes:
(a) Values rounded down to nearest whole number.
A discussion of the implications of this force structure
follows.
D. SCENARIO IMPLICATIONS AND SUMMARY
The situation represented by the post-attack disposition
of U. S. strategic nuclear forces in Table IX is
disquieting. Consider the following schema for interpreting
the outcome of the hypothetical Soviet counterforce strike.
Destruction of ICBM capabilities . The Titan and
Minuteman ICBM systems incurred respective losses on the
order of 88 and 87 percent for an aggregate reduction of the
pre-attack force level of 87 percent. The total number of
warheads now available for prompt retaliatory counterforce
missions rests at 278, assuming the Soviets achieved a
uniform rate of silo destruction. When these "survivors" are
attenuated with the applicable 3000 psi TKP values to deter-
mine their effectiveness against Soviet silos (Table III),
the expected number of prompt hard target kill capable
warheads diminishes to 137.
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Loss of inport SSBNs . Although the U. S. SSBN force
provides a limited hard target kill capability, its utility
in the execution of prompt non-HTK counterforce tasking is
substantial. Assuming an inport rate of 40 percent for both
Poseidon and Trident systems [ Ref . 7: pp. 176,181], the
destruction of all three SSBN bases represents the loss of
approximately 2093 warheads well suited for GMT counterforce
missions.
Attrition of strategic bombers . The reduction in U. S.
strategic bomber strength is nearly complete. In a day-to-
day alert situation, approximately 30 percent of the SAC
bomber force is maintained on a "quick reaction" alert at 16
airfields [Ref. 32: p. 46] . This equates to a total alert
bomber force of approximately 96 aircraft. A flight of 6
bombers would be found at each base assuming a uniform
distribution of available aircraft among alert airfields.
Table IX indicates that the assets of a single SAC base ( 6
bombers) would be be expected to survive the initial Soviet
strike.
Loss of LCCs . Each Titan missile system has its own
separate launch control center; in the case of Minuteman an
LCC provides operational control for a flight of ten
missiles [Ref. 33: p. 42]. An aggregate attrition rate on
the order of 87 percent for the Titan and Minuteman LCCs
poses a very serious threat to the potency of the residual
U. S. ICBM force. The 17 remaining launch control centers
would be capable of providing operational control for no
more than a total of 130 missiles (278 warheads), assuming a
proportional distribution of the LCCs among the surviving
Titans and Minutemen. However , a less than uniform distri -
bution of the LCCs among the " survivors " could conceivably
reduce the optomistic total of 278 available counterforce
warheads to even lower levels .
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As if these observations by themselves are insufficient
cause for alarm, consider the additional damage inflicted on
U. S. strategic nuclear capabilities by Soviet counterforce
strikes against OMTs omitted from the hypothetical scenario.
The likely destruction and disruption of critical C3 nodes,
national command links, etc. , further exacerbate an already
dismal situation.
Three categories of possible responses exist for this
dilemma; two are readily apparent. The first, and perhaps
most obvious would dictate complete capitulation on the part
of the United States in the face of an omnipotent Soviet
adversary. Conversely, the second choice would mandate a
U. S. retaliation using the residual ICBM, SLBM and bomber
forces against the Soviet Union in a totally unrestrained
"spasm" response replete with acts of random nuclear
violence on a massive scale. In light of. the evidence
presented in this work regarding the intent of the strategic
doctrine of the United States , it is suggested that the
Hobson' s choice represented by these two options is nothing
short of ridiculous .
If, however, these two "options" accurately define the
endpoints of a continuum of strategic options, then it is
logical to presume the existence of a point of balance. This
fulcrum must represent an optimal solution for avoidance of
the dilemma presented in the preceeding sections. The
author's research indicates that such a balance would be
best achieved through the development of a sensible strategy
which incorporates strategic defense in a manner consistent
with the objective of enhancing the deterrence process. As a
prelude to the examination of possible measures of effec-
tiveness for such a strategy, the subsequent chapter briefly
examines the fundamental concepts, systems and technologies
associated with the concept of strategic defense.
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IV. CONCEPTS m STRATEGIC DEFENSE
A. OVERVIEW
' This chapter conducts a brief, non-technical review of
fundamental concepts, systems, and technologies associated
with strategic defenses. First, the characteristics of
modern ballistic missiles are outlined to facilitate a
better understanding of the technological challenges associ-
ated with strategic defense. Next, the basic goals and
objectives of strategic defense and the assortment of
tactical options available for the execution of this task
are examined. Last, a review of proposed systems and tech-
nologies is conducted as a prelude to the formulation of
MOEs for counterforce enhancing systems of strategic
defense.
B." BALLISTIC MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS
An understanding of the operational characteristics of
ballistic missiles is crucial in evaluating the architec-
tures of proposed defensive systems. Two aspects of
ballistic missile flight profiles warrant particular atten-
tion; the type of trajectory flown and the composite phases
associated with typical ballistic missile trajectories.
Ballistic missile trajectories fall into three general
categories: lofted, minimum energy and depressed. Table VII
illustrates the variation in several key operational parame-
ters for an MX type ICBM flown over several 10,000 km launch
to impact profiles [ Ref . 34: p. 9] .
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TABLE X
-
ICBM TRAJECTORIES
Type reentry anale
( degrees;
apogee
(km)
flight time
(min)
lofted
minimum ene
depressed
rgy
35
23
15
2300
1200
900
42
31
28
Each of these ballistic missile trajectories can be
divided into four distinct phases:
• Boost-phase . Commencing at launch, this phase termi-
nates with the burnout of the second or third stage
booster motors, depending on the individual missile s
design. Solid fuel ICBMs, such as the U. S. MX, have
boost phases averaging 180 seconds in duration and
reach an altitude of 200 km when launched in minimum
energy (normal) ballistic trajectories [ Ref . 34:
pp. 7-10]
.
• Post-boost phase . Typically several hundred seconds in
duration, a postboost vehicle (PBV) maneuvers with low
energy thrusters and deploys individual reentry vehi-
cles (RVs> on precise ballistic trajectories in this
phase [Ref. 35: p. 52] . In addition, the PBV releases a
variety of penetration aids (penaids), such as "chaff"
or aerosol clouds, to complicate tracking of the RVs by
defensive systems.
• Midcourse phase . Beginning with the completion of RV
and penaid deployment, this phase may last as long as
1000 seconds I Ref . 35: pp. 52-53] . During this time,
the RVs and penaids travel on ballistic trajectories,
reaching an apogee of approximately 1200km in a minimum
energy trajectory [Ref. 34: p. 7]
.
• Terminal ( reentry ) phase . This phase begins with RV
and penaid interaction with the sensible atmosphere
(100 km); reentry phase duration is a function of the
specific trajectory and may range from 30 to 100
seconds in length [Ref. 35: p. 53].
The boost and terminal phases of submarine launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and intermediate range ballistic
missiles ( IRBMs) are generally similar to those of ICBMs;
post-boost and midcourse phases of these systems, however,
are usually less extensive [Ref. 36: p. 15]
.
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C. DEFENSIVE CONCEPTS
In the most basic terms, strategic defense systems have
either point or area defense as its primary goal. Point
defenses emphasize the protection of relatively small, well
defined areas, such as an ICBM silo or airfield. Area
systems, as the name suggests, are much broader in their
defensive scope and might have the protection of large-scale
industrial/urban ( I/U) areas as a primary mission.
Carter [ Ref . 37: pp. 103-105] describes three tactical
approaches associated with strategic defense. The first
tactic, preferential defense , is designed to protect prede-
signated portions of a potential target set. To accomplish
this goal, a preferential defense concentrates its defensive
effort on a specific subset of the potential target set and
either keeps secret which targets it intends to defend or
redirects the defensive effort at the commencement of the
attack. Since the offense has no way of knowing on which
target set to concentrate its assault, it is forced to
attack all targets as if they were equally defended. The
result is a commitment of offensive assets on undefended
targets disproportionately higher than the number of
deployed defensive systems.
The second approach, that of the layered defense . is
designed to increase the number of opportunities available
to the defense for offensive warhead destruction.
Multi-layered defense is generally considered to have two
distinct advantages over single-layer systems. In terms of
engineering and probabilistic considerations, multi-layered
systems alleviate the need to seek extremely high levels of
effectiveness for each individual layer of the system.
Furthermore, multi-layered systems, with their use of
different sensors and weapons, diminish the cability of the
offense to entirely countermeasure the system while
enhancing the defense's ability to overcome offensive
countermeasures [Ref. 38: p. 2951] .
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The third concept, threshold defense , is somewhat more
subtle in context. Carter explains the primary objective of
this tactic:
In threshold defense it is conceded that the target can
be destroyed at a price that is not prohibitive, but the
presence of defense is thought to require the offense to
mount a relatively large and complex attack. The scale
of the attack is imagined to exceed some threshold the
attacker is unwilling to cross, either because it would
provoke a massive retaliation or because it would
provide the victim an assured tactical warning that
would mitigate the effect of the attack. [ Ref . 37:
p. 105]
In other words, threshold defense may be construed as a
tactic designed to achieve relatively modest levels of
defense while simultaneuosly serving as a sort of escalatory
"trip-wire" over which the offense had best not tread.
D. SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGIES
The tactical concepts of preferential, layered, and
threshold defense combine with the operational characteris-
tics of ballistic missiles to produce a synergistic influ-
ence on the determination of defensive systems
architectures. Carter [Ref. 37: pp. 120-122] groups BMD
systems and technologies into five functional categories:
traditional systems,
simple/novel systems,
layered defense with advanced exoatmospheric overlay
and traditional underlay,
boost-phase and directed energy systems, and
dust defense.
Each of these is examined in the following paragraphs.
1. Traditional Defense
Traditional systems usually consist of ground-based
nuclear or nonnuclear high-acceleration interceptors and
their supporting target tracking facilities. Dedicated to
the missions of both point and area defense, traditional
systems are generally regarded as capable of modestly
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fulfilling the objectives of the tactical options of prefer-
ential, layered, and threshold defense. A classic example of
this type of system may be found in the now defunct
SAFEGUARD ABM system [ Ref . 39: pp. 198-200]
.
2. Simple/Novel Defense
A variety of weapons systems and technologies are
currently available for simple/novel defense including
conventionally armed radar or infrared homing missiles,
swarms or clouds of unguided ballistic projectiles, and
anti-aircraft guns. Two proposed simple/novel defensive
concepts are reviewed here: the radar directed GAU-8 30mm
minicannon and the SWARMJET system. Both of these systems
are well suited for the point defense mission and, like the
traditional systems meet the basic tactical considerations
for strategic defense.
The General Electric GAU-8 gun represents a devel-
oped and proven weapons system readily adaptable for the
point defense mission. Currently employed as an anti-tank
weapon in the Fairchild A-10 attack aircraft, the GAU-8 has
a three thousand round-per-minute firing rate, an effective
range in excess of 8000 feet, and a kill probability of over
90 percent against a warhead-sized target at that range. RV
destruction would be accomplished through a kinetic energy
nonnuclear kill (NNK) [Ref. 40: p. 44]
.
The SWARMJET system is designed to saturate a
"threat core" with swarms of small, spin-stabilized rockets
accelerated to mile-per-second speed in short-interval
salvos (on the order of one second) from hardened recoilless
launchers. Target tracking is accomplished through triangu-
lation by range-only radars [ Ref s. 41: pp. 48-51] . As is the
case with the GAU-8, warhead destruction is accomplished
through a kinetic energy NNK.
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3. Layered. Defense With Advanced Exoatmospheric Overlay
and Traditional Underlay
As the name suggests, this type of system would
combine the previously mentioned traditional or simple/novel
components with an exoatmospheric interceptor of the HOE
(Homing Overlay Experiment) variety. The composite technol-
ogies required for the overlay portion of this type of
defense were successfully demonstrated at the Kwajalein
Atoll in the June 11 1984 Project Homing Overlay Experiment
(HOE) [Ref. 42: p. 41] .
In the
.
HOE flight, a Minuteman ICBM was equipped
with a sophisticated IR sensor and 15 foot expanding metal
mesh net designed to "snare" the target, an ICBM launched
from Vandenberg AFB situated more than 4800 miles away from
the Kwajalein Atoll [Ref. 42: p. 41] . The result was a spec-
tacular exoatmospheric NNK of the dummy reentry vehicle at a
range of approximately 100 miles.
HOE type interceptors operating in conjunction with
simple/novel defense systems are appropriate for both point
and limited area defense missions and might be of great
value in the realization of the goals of preferential,
layered, and threshold defense.
4. Boost-phase and Directed- energy Defenses
Successful boost-phase interception of offensive
ICBMs is widely regarded as the key to a thorough system of
strategic defense [Ref. 38: p. 3117] . These types of
systems, however, which employ either directed-energy weap-
onry (i.e., chemical lasers, particle beams, hypervelocity
rail guns, etc. ) or more technologically "traditional"
devices (high-acceleration missiles mounted on sattelite
"trucks"), or a combination of both involve considerable
unknowns. By definition, boost-phase interception cannot
fulfill the objectives of the preferential defense since the
intended targets of the RVs cannot be predicted during this
phase of the missile's flight [Ref. 37: p. 121] . This type
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of system would merge well with the tactics of layered and
threshold defense, however.
Defensive systems utilizing directed-energy weapons
for boost-phase intercept are essentially in their infancy.
On the other hand, the proposed use of available technolo-
gies to engineer hybrid systems for boost-phase intercept
has received considerable attention. Systems of this nature
usually assume the following basic characteristics (with
some variations).
The fundamental theme in this proposal calls for a
system of satellite "trucks" equipped with relatively inex-
pensive high-acceleration interceptors [ Ref . 40: p. 42] .
These satellites would be deployed in "spread orbits" at an
altitude of 250 to 350 miles to form a continuous blanket of
coverage over Soviet ICBM fields [Ref. 41: p. 55] . When
detection of boosting Soviet ICBMs occurs, the "trucks"
begin to salvo interceptors at the rising targets, based on
tracking telemetry supplied by four geosynchronous battle
management satellites and ten low altitude surveillance and
tracking platforms. [Ref. 43: p. 46] . These interceptors
would then detonate a warhead package designed to create a
debris "cloud" roughly 100 feet in diameter in the unalter-
able ballistic trajectory of the Soviet RVs. Impact of the
RVs with the debris would cause a kinetic energy NNK.
While it is possible to ascertain the effectiveness
of individual components in this type of defense, it is
difficult to ascertain the utility of the entire system
without an extensive program of testing and evaluation under
realistic operational conditions. This same sort of dilemma
also holds true for systems employing advanced directed
energy devices.
5. Dust Defense
Dust defense is the least technologically sophisti-
cated system of BIYID. In this system, high-yield nuclear
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weapons are buried north of U. S. ICBM silo fields ( the most
likely line of approach for incoming Soviet ICBM RVs) and
are detonated after receipt of positive notification of an
impending attack. The detonation of these devices raises
large quantities of dust and debris in the path of the
incoming warheads and destroys them through erosion of the
RV' s heatshield.
Systems of this type are well suited for the point
defense mission and are highly advantageous in terms of
technological simplicity. In addition, these systems are
capable of nearly total attrition of an approaching RV
"wave" with minimal weapon and targeting requirements.
However, the implications of an accidental detonation due to
a false alarm and the inadequacies of this system for urban
area defense are obvious [ Ref . 35: pp. 90-91] .
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V. h MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR STRATEGIC DEFENSE
A. OVERVIEW
The research presented thus far demonstrates the
centrality of the concept of deterrence and the preeminence
of the countervailing strategy in declaratory U. S. strategic
nuclear policy. In addition, the preceeding chapters under-
score the importance of U. S. strategic nuclear forces in
fulfilling these objectives as well as the increasing
vulnerability of these forces--particularly the ICBM leg of
the TRIAD--to burgeoning Soviet nuclear might. In light of
these and other previously discussed considerations, employ-
ment of strategic defenses designed primarily to enhance the
deterrence process by increasing SNF survivability may
clearly be construed as a viable option for the United
States.
Taken separately, these concepts suffice as qualitative
inputs in the formulation of measures of effectiveness for
strategic defenses. Quantitative inputs, on the other hand,
arrive from an evaluation of the degree of effectiveness
U. S. strategic forces are expected to maintain in a nuclear
exchange with the Soviet Union. This knowledge permits the
analyst to determine the minimum required survivable force
levels which strategic defense must guarantee in order to
effectively implement the nuclear war plans of the United
States .
Planning documents which prescribe the actual usage of
U. S. SNF in a nuclear exchange, such as the Single
Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) or Nuclear Weapons
Employment Policy (NUWEP) provide the best source of data
for this type of analysis. However, due to the unclassified
nature of this thesis, the level of quantitative precision
attainable from an examination of these documents cannot be
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achieved. Nevertheless, open source literature and "sani-
tized" official political documents applicable to strategic
nuclear force employment policies exist in sufficient quan-
tity to facilitate a reasonable approximation of U. S.
nuclear exchange objectives.
B. U. S. TARGETING CONSIDERATIONS
Friedberg [ Ref . 8: p. 572] notes that a "persistent
interest" in the targeting of Soviet military installations,
including hardened ICBM silos, command and control bunkers
and nuclear weapons storage facilities, is reflected in the
policy statements of Department of Defense officials from
1974 to the present. January 17 1974, however, represents a
watershed in the evolution of U. S. nulcear employment poli-
cies. On that date. President Richard Nixon signed National
Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)-242, a document promul-
gating "a new national guidance for strategic employment
policy . . . and the incorporation of greater flexibility
into the U.S. nuclear posture " (emphasis added). [Ref. 25:
p. 621] NSDiyi-242 also empowered Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger to develop the NUWEP, a document designed to
fulfill the political mandate for greater strategic flexi-
bility stipulated by NSDM-242 [Ref. 25: p. 622] . The
"greater flexibility" was to be achieved through the devel-
opment of sets of selected targeting options for the SIOP
and SIOP forces.
Inputs to the target base for the SIOP and SIOP forces
are managed primarily by the National Strategic Target List
Division (NSTLD) of the Joint Strategic Target Planning
Staff (JSTPS). Prior to the so-called "Schlesinger shift" of
early 1974, the national strategic target list (NSTL)
consisted of approximately 25,000 potential targets. By
1980, the increased emphasis on flexibility through selected
targeting options embodied in NSDiyi-242 had caused the NSTL
to expand to nearly 40,000 potential target installations
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[ Ref . 44: p. 108] . According to testimony provided to the
Senate Armed Services Committee by the Department of Defense
in 1980 [Ref. 45: p. 2721], the 40,000 target installations
are divided into five general categories:
(1) War supporting industry :
• Ammunition factories.
• Tank and armored personnel carrier factories.
• Petroleum refineries.
• Railway yards and repair facilities.
( 2
)
Industry that contributes to economic recovery :
Coal.
Basic Steel.
Basic aluminum
Cement.
Electric Power.
( 3 Conventional military forces ;
Kasernes.
Supply depots.
Marshalling points.
Conventional airfields.
Ammunition storage facilities.
Tank and vehicle storage yards.
(4) Nuclear forces :
• ICBM/ 1 RBiyi( Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles) LF's
(Launch Facilities) and LCC's
• Nuclear weapon storage sites.
• Long range avaition bases (nuclear capable aircraft).
• SSBN bases.
(5) Command and control :
• Command posts.
• Key communications facilities.
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Of the preceeding categories, the two which contain the
bulk of significantly hardened (i.e., greater than 2000 psi
resiliency) Soviet military assets are the nuclear forces
and command and control target sets. In the event of a
nuclear exchange, U. S. planning requirements dictate the
prompt destruction of these target sets be achieved by
retaliatory U. S. SNF to preclude the possibility of either a
counterforce or countervalue oriented Soviet second strike .
The destruction of war supporting industries, industries
contributing to economic reconstitution and conventional
military forces, while significant in its own right, never-
theless does not constitute a time-urgent target set. The
issue then becomes one of how best to apply the components
of the strategic TRIAD to fulfill the flexible targeting
objectives against Soviet nuclear forces and command and
control facilities delineated in the NXJWEP and the SIOP.
C. AN MCE FOR ICBM SURVIVABILITY
Chapter II demonstrated that at the present, the land-
based ICBM components of U. S. SNF represent the best mecha-
nism for achieving prompt hard target kills based on the
characteristics and capabilities of these weapons systems.
Submarine launched ballistic missiles are adequate as far as
time-urgency considerations are concerned but have only a
limited HTK capability. In the case of strategic bombers,
the criteria of time-urgency and HTK capability are essen-
tially the reverse of SLBMs, and the issue of successful
penetration of hostile airspace arises.
However, Chapter III illustrated the increasing vulner-
ability of the U. S. ICBM force to a preemptive Soviet first
strike. While it is true that a significant number of at-sea
SLBM warheads remain in the scenario depicted in Table IX,
these warheads would be of dubious utility in the conduct of
effective retaliatory strikes against target sets (4) and
(5). This is a result of the overall performance of U.S.
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SLBM systems against 1000 psi (and greater) targets (See
Table III). Since target sets (4) and (5) are truly time-
urgent in character, the possible use of strategic bombers
against these categories does not even warrant consideration
in this discussion due to the long transit times associated
with these platforms. A two-fold question must therefore be
addressed: What portion( s) of target sets (4) and (5) neces-
sitate the exclusive use of U. S. ICBMs, and what are the
total warhead requirements to effect the destruction of
these targets.
Two criteria will be used in evaluating a potential
target set as warranting the expenditure of a U. S. HTK ICBM
warhead. The first is essentially a technical requirement;
the target should be hardened to withstand blast overpres -
sures of a sufficiently high level which only an ICBM
warhead can obviate. A target resiliency of 2000 psi or
greater will be used in the target designation process.
Second, and most importantly, the target should represent a
significant Soviet military asset which unless promptly
destroyed by a U.S. ICBM warhead
.
would contribute a great
deal to a Soviet second strike capability .
In the category of Soviet nuclear forces, the ICBM silos
and their associated LCCs clearly qualify as a prompt coun-
terforce target set for the U. S. ICBM force, utilizing the
previously defined criteria. Intermediate range ballistic
missiles( i. e. , SS-20) and their associated launch facilities
are generally mobile, lightly armored systems and are there-
fore susceptible to greatly reduced blast overpressures.
Although nuclear weapons storage sites would no doubt be
significantly hardened and would represent a sizeable reload
capability for the SS-17 and SS-18 systems (a total of 458
silos) they do not constitute a particularly time-urgent
target set suitable for U. S. ICBM warhead expenditure. A
recent large-scale reload exercise of SS-18 silos indicated
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that from two to five days are required to complete this
type of evolution [ Ref . 46: pp. 14-15] . Additionally, while
long range Soviet aviation bases supporting nuclear capable
aircraft are time-urgent targets, they are unlikely poten-
tial targets for HTK ICBM warheads due to the inherent
vulnerability of most aircraft to blast overpressures in
excess of 3 psi [Ref. 47: p. 29] . Soviet SSBN support facil-
ities would also not be considered as potential U. S. ICBM
target sets as the majority of the structures at these bases
and pier-side submarines are not likely to withstand blast
overpressures exceeding the 500 to 1000 psi range. With the
exception of the highly resilient Soviet ICBM and LCC
network then, the balance of the nuclear forces target
category would be best suited for targeting by the non-ICBM
forces of the TRIAD.
The category of Soviet command and control facilities
contains a mix of target sets which could conceivably
require utilization of HTK ICBM warheads by the United
States. For example, as early as 1977 the Soviets were known
to have constructed underground command and control centers
for the political and military leadership in the metropol-
itan Moscow area capable of withstanding 1000 psi blast
overpressures [ Ref . 48: p. 42] . In the same year, a report
issued by the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) acknowledged that the Soviets had also constructed a
multitude of command and communications facilities which are
hardened to over 500 psi of blast overpressure [ Ref. 49:
pp. 18-20] . It is reasonable to suggest that the Soviets
have improved these facilities in the time which has elapsed
since the information in the ACDA report was made public.
Admittedly, these facilities approach the 2000 psi blast
overpressure criteria and might legitimately be construed in
some cases as potential U. S. ICBM targets. Furthermore,
these target sets are decidedly important to the Soviet
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Union for. nuclear battle management. However, it is highly
likely that these assets would essentially be rendered impo -
tent by the destruction of the military centerpiece essen-
tial to the achievement of Soviet nuclear warfiahtina
objectives ; namely , the ICBMs of the Soviet Strategic Rocket
Forces ( SRF ). Therefore, it is suggested that the category
of command and control is best suited for targeting by the
non-ICBM STOP forces of the United States.
In sum, the target category truly warranting the prompt
expenditure of ICBM warheads in a retaliatory U. S. second
strike consists of Soviet ICBM silos and launch control
centers. Currently, this target set consists of 1398 silos
and 300 launch control centers distributed in 28 "fields"
throughout the Soviet Union [ Ref . 44: p. 108] . These
figures, however, comprise a pre-exchanae hard target set
for U. S. ICBM warhead employment.
If the Soviets were to utilize roughly 210 HTK ICBMs in
a preliminary counterforce strike against U. S. SNF ( See
Table VII), this target set would be reduced to 1190 ICBM
silos and 260 "threat" LCCs (values rounded to nearest ten).
The reduction in the silo target base is obtained simply by
subtracting the "fired" Soviet ICBM systems from the pre-
attack figure. The attrition of the pre-attack LCC value of
300 by 40 units is based on an assumption that Soviet LCCs
manage silos at a uniform rate of 300 to 1400, or approxi-
mately one LCC for every five ICBMs. At this rate, the
firing of 210 silos would eliminate nearly 40 units from the
pool of "threat" launch control centers.
Based on the preceeding analysis, a revised total of
1450 (1190 plus 260) hardened installations warranting the
expenditure of U. S. ICBM HTK warheads is obtained. Assuming
U. S. targeting objectives stipulate the assignment of a
single. reliable warhead to each of these facilities, a
minimum of seventy percent of the 2100 warhead Minuteman
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force would be required to effectively negate the second
strike capability embodied in the "new" Soviet nuclear force
target base (Titan lis deleted for simplicity). A given
assumption throughout this analysis is the presence of a
sufficiently robust U.S. command, control, communications
and intelligence (C3I) network able to rapidly ascertain the
location of these installations and disseminate retargeting
data to the surviving Minuteman force.
However, the Minuteman force remaining at the termina-
tion of the Soviet counterforce strike depicted in Table VII
is only capable of mustering 274 available (not necessarily
reliable) HTK warheads. These 270-odd warheads would be
capable of targeting a mere eighteen percent of the
remaining 1450 Soviet ICBMs and LCCs. It is arguably certain
that even if these surviving U. S. warheads should manage to
destroy a full 18 percent of the revised nuclear forces
target set, the Soviets could still field somewhere in the
neighborhood of one thousand ICBMs, assuming an equitable
destruction of both ICBMs and LCCs was achieved by the
residual Minuteman force.
The issue then becomes one of how to fill a gap of
nearly fifty percent between U.S. targeting objectives and
the realities of the post-attack ICBM force disposition
depicted in Table IX. An obvious solution would be the
employment of active strategic defenses to make up the
deficit between U. S. strategic intentions and capabilities.
Based on these and other considerations presented in the
preceeding paragraphs, a system of strategic defense
designed to enhance the deterrence process by reducing the
vulnerability of U.S. SNF should , as a minimum, be capable
of ensuring the survival of seventy percent of the ICBM leg
of the strategic TRIAD . The translation of U. S. strategic
targeting objectives into a quantified value for ICBM
survivability represents a valid measure of effectiveness
for a system of strategic defense .
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D. A HYPOTHETICAL SYSTEM OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE
Chapter IV examined the fundamental concepts, systems,
and technologies associated with strategic defense.
Particularly noteworthy are the concepts of layered defense
with advanced exoatmospheric overlay and traditional
underlay, and the simple/novel defense systems. These
concepts merit further study for three reasons.
First, the technologies employed in these types of stra-
tegic defenses are, for the most part, rapidly maturing
(i.e., the HOE-type interceptor) if not actually available
"off the shelf" (i.e., the GAU-8 cannon). Second, layered
defenses obviate the need to seek high levels of performance
at each individual layer of the system. Additionally,
layered defenses reduce the ability of the offense to coun-
termeasure the entire system and enhance the capability of
the defense to overcome countermeasures due to the multipl-
icity of defensive weapons and sensors employed in the
process. Finally, these types of systems are generally
regarded as being well suited to the point defense of U. S.
ICBM silos and LCCs.
The hypothetical system of strategic defense envisaged
in this section consists of a layered defense with advanced
exoatmospheric overlay and a simple/novel defense underlay.
Two considerations justify the substitution of simple/novel
defenses in place of the traditional system underlay. The
first is the proven technological feasibility of point/novel
defenses. Although the systems architecture presented here
emphasizes point/novel defenses in the generic sense,
testing and evaluation of candidate underlay systems such as
the GAU-8 has yielded impressively high performance values
suggesting an excellent technological disposition to the
role of point defense [ Ref . 40: p. 44. ] . The second consid-
eration is the attainment of mathematical simplicity in the
probabilistic modeling used to evaluate the performance of a
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layered system of strategic defense. Because the effective
ranges of point/novel defenses are several orders of magni-
tude less than those of the advanced exoatmospheric overlay
(i.e., 1. 3nm for the GAU-8 as opposed to lOOnm for HOE-type
interceptors), simultaneous interception of a Soviet warhead
by the underlay and the overlay may be regarded as mutually
exclusive probabilistic events. This greatly simplifies the
modeling process used in the evaluation of this type of
strategic defense.
Suppose the United States were to develop and deploy
strategic defenses conforming to the systems architecture
described above at each of the potential targets listed in
Table VII. Assume further that operational testing and eval-
uation programs have demonstrated a warhead kill probability
of . 7 for each type of platform used in both the overlay and
underlay networks. In addition, the defenses located at
each potential target site possess sufficient logistic
robustness and tactical responsiveness to effectively engage
up to six warheads per designated target in rapid sequence.
This assumption is based on a uniform distribution of over
6000 Soviet HTK ICBM warheads (Table IV) among approximately
1000 hardened U. S. military targets in an all-out Soviet
counterforce strike as opposed to the "partial" strike
depicted in Table VII. Furthermore, assume that the defen-
sive network is optimally deployed in a geographic sense to
facilitate a layered defense of U. S. ICBMs and LCCs plus the
strategic bomber and SSBN support bases. Again, the presump-
tion of a survivable C3I network is applied. An evaluation
of this particular system of strategic defense follows.
1. Evaluating the Hypothetical System .
The probability that an attacking Soviet warhead is
destroyed by either an advanced exoatmospheric overlay or a
simple/novel underlay (but not both) is determined by the
following equation [ Ref . 31: p. 24]
:
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P(OUU) = P(0) + P(U) - P(OnU). (eqn 5.1)
In equation (5.1) the variables and U represent the prob-
ability of achieving warhead kill by the overlay and
underlay systems, respectively. Substitution of the values
of . 7 for both O and U in the above equation yields an
overall warhead kill probability of . 91 for the layered
system of strategic defenses described in the preceeding
section.
By using the methodology for determining the
expected value of a discrete random variable [ Ref . 17:
p. 125] , it is possible to merge this value with the Soviet
counterforce scenario in Chapter III (Table VII) to arrive
at a revised disposition of post-attack U. S. SNF. The
results are presented in the following table, which includes
undefended post-attack disposition data (Table IX) and
percent improvement in SNF survivability for purpose of
comparison.
TABLE XI
POST ATTACK COMPOSITION OF U. S. SNF (DEFENDED)
Target Pre-attack Post-attack Post-attack
chng.( defended) ( undefended)
ICBM LCCs 133 110 17 70
Titan II 33 27 4 70
Minuteman II 450 372 59 70
Minuteman III 250 206 98 43
(Mk-12)
Minuteman III 300 248 117 43
(_Mk-12A)
SSBN BASES 3 1 33
SAC BASES 16 12 1 69
Notes:
(a) Values rounded down to nearest whole number.
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A cursory examination of the revised data in Table
IX clearly indicates the dramatic improvement in post-attack
U. S. ICBM force levels. The employment of a layered system
of strategic defenses to protect U. S. SNF produced a new
total of 1734 available Minuteman warheads for use in second
strike counterforce targeting scenarios. This is equivalent
to 82 percent of the pre-attack Minuteman force levels . In
addition, strategic bomber survivability has been increased
to the 75 percent level. However, the preservation of the
SSBN support facilities leaves a great deal to be desired.
E. SUMMARY
The most important conclusion to be derived from this
chapter is obvious: Utilization of a layered system of
strategic defense drastically improves the survivability of
the ICBM leg of the strategic TRIAD . The hypothetical
systems architecture evaluated in this section exceeded the
MOE of 70 percent ICBM survivability by better than ten
percent. Furthermore, significant gains in U. S. second
strike counterforce potential were achieved through the
partial improvements in the survivability of strategic
bomber bases and SSBN support facilities. The importance of
enhanced U. S. ICBM survivability, however, cannot be overem-
phasized. Research presented in this and previous chapters
clearly underscores the national need for maintaining a
viable second strike ICBM force in order to fulfill U. S.
strategic targeting objectives of effectively negating a
Soviet second strike capability. Strategic defenses provide
the necessary means to achieve this given end.
A second observation also warrants brief mention here.
The methodology used in the development and evaluation of a
hypothetical system of strategic defense enjoys equal
validity for alternative systems architectures utilizing
advanced technologies (i.e. , directed-energy weapons) and
additional layering (i.e. , more than two). It is reasonable
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to suggest that the augmentation of a layered system of
exoatmospheric overlay with point/novel underlay by a system
of boost-phase defenses using maturing technologies would
likely yield even greater improvements in U. S. strategic
nuclear force survivability.
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VI. SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS
A. RESEARCH RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Seven basic conclusions and recommendations which may be
derived from the research presented in this work warrant
reiteration in this brief summary chapter. The ordering
sequence of these observations is chronological in nature.
First, the fundamental strategic objective of the United
States is the deterrence of Soviet aggressions which could
conceivably escalate to a large-scale nuclear confrontation
between the superpowers. The validity of this notion may be
substantiated through a careful examination of the official
declaratory posture statements of the U. S. political leader-
ship over a period spanning two decades. The centrality of
deterrence theory to the U. S. strategic planning process is
likely to enjoy viability well into the immediate future.
Second, the strategic paradigm through which the United
States nurtures the deterrence process is not one of mutu-
ally assured vulnerability through the prospect of massive
societal punishment, nor is it one of a prevailing strategy.
Contrary to popular perceptions within a sizeable portion of
the intellectual community, the mechanism through which the
U. S, effectively deters the Soviet Union is that of the
countervailing strategy. This paradigm emphasizes the
thwarting or denial of Soviet objectives across the spectrum
of conflict. It is decidedly not one of indiscriminate
destruction of the Soviet populace or the imposition of
military and political victory in the classical sense--two
attributes identified respectively with the mutual assured
vulnerability and prevailing strategy schools of deterrent
thought.
Furthermore, an examination of the strategic doctrine of
the Soviet Union substantiates the hypothesis that the
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Soviets do not adhere to the paradigm of mutually assured
vulnerability. The literature of the field unequivocally
suggests a complete rejection of the mutual restraint and
assured vulnerability associated with the assured destruc-
tionist school of deterrent thought prevalent among the
Western defense intellectual community. The political and
military leadership of the Soviet Union regard the deter-
rence process as a means of diminishing the probability of a
U. S. initiated nuclear conflict while simultaneously facili-
tating a paralysis of the Western Alliance to resist future
Soviet expansionism. If any Western paradigm of deterrence
is applicable to the strategic intent of the Soviet Union it
would clearly be one of the prevailing strategy with its
requisite emphasis on military and political victory.
Fourth, the strategic nuclear forces of both the Soviet
Union and the United States are representative of the what
is perceived as viable means for achieving the stated objec-
tives of the declaratory policies of the two superpowers.
However, an examination of the countermilitary potential of.
the SNF of both nations indicates that the Soviets possess
significant leverage in terms of hard target kill ICBM weap-
onry. This Soviet capability may be legitimately construed
as an effective tool for fulfilling the prevailing strategic
approach to nuclear war-fighting frequently posited in
Soviet literature. What is particularly disquieting though,
is the increasing vulnerability and accompanying reduced
countermilitary potential of U. S. SNF due to burgeoning
Soviet ICBM capabilities. This situation poses increasingly
serious challenges to the U. S. strategic nuclear capability
mandatory for the fulfillment of stated political objectives
of achieving deterrence through a countervailing strategy.
The fifth observation concerns the increasing vulner-
ability of the U. S. ICBM force to growing Soviet HTK capa-
bilities as demonstrated with the hypothetical Soviet first
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strike scenario depicted in Chapter IV. The disposition of
post-attack U. S. SNF are clearly inadequate for the execu-
tion of the counterforce second strike targeting require-
ments stipulated in the same chapter. Resolution of this
scenario was reduced to three alternatives: complete capitu-
lation, indiscriminate spasm countervalue strikes with resi-
dual U. S. SIOP forces, or the utilization of strategic
defenses to reduce Soviet incentives for preemption by revi-
talizing the survivability of the U. S. deterrent force. In
light of U. S. strategic targeting considerations in a coun-
terforce second strike, a measure of effectiveness for a
deterrence enhancing system of strategic defense was deter-
mined to be preservation of seventy percent of pre-attack
U. S. ICBM force levels.
Sixth, the methodology of measures of effectiveness
provides a useful tool in assessing the utility of alterna-
tive approaches for achieving the strategic objectives of
the United States. In the area of strategic defense, the
greatly simplified strawman concept developed and evaluated
in this thesis represents the utilization of the measures of
effectiveness methodology at a most basic level.
Nevertheless, the basic principles of goal identification,
quantiflability and the ability to measure to what degree
the stated goal is achieved requisite with the MOE process
require the analyst to focus attention where it matters the
most.
Finally, the entirety of this work is offered as
evidence to support the recommendation that serious consid-
eration be given to the development and deployment of a
system of strategic defense fundamentally consistent with
the hypothetical architecture examined in this work as
expeditiously as possible. The continued vitality of the
deterrence process dictates nothing less.
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